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Abstract
Voting analysts in the United States have attempted to predict political orientation
based on race, gender, occupation, educational achievement, and economic background. Yet,
the substantial amount of research available on these factors has been directed toward the
understanding of the white-majority vote. Now, as a result of the overwhelming growth of
ethnic minority populations scholars are beginning to look at the potential decisive role of
ethnic minority voters. Part of this newly formed voting bloc consists of Hispanics which are
now one of the fastest and largest racial minority groups in the United States. This thesis aims
to understand the Hispanic electorate by addressing their social mobility. Furthermore, this
research will shed light into the socio-economic factors affecting the political affiliation of
Hispanic voters.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The primary questions concerning the nature of party identification in American politics
linger around the conclusion that people’s socio-economic status is a good fit for determining
their political partisanship. The beginnings of this argument can be found in The American
Voter where Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1980) propose that any valuable model of
partisanship will frequently have party identification come as result of social causes (Campell,
et. al., 1980). In other words, party preferences have a lot more to do with social factors than
political issues (Campell, et. al., 1980). With this in mind, scholars have long debated the
strength of significance in relating socially driven variables such as socio-economic status to an
individual’s party identification. To this day, many of the studies available on party
identification concentrate on the large sectors of the white (Anglo) American population. The
scholarly interest on identifying partisanship has often overlooked and in some cases entirely
forgotten about minority populations.
The 2010 census reports that the fastest growing ethnic group in the United States is the
“Hispanic” or “Latino” population. Political researchers hypothesize that it is only a matter of
time before Hispanics completely change the political landscape of our major political
institutions. Since political parties tend to be one, if not the most important political institution,
it is now time to consider the role the Latino electorate will play in their development. In order
to understand this dynamic, the current research on party affiliation needs to accommodate
previously thought models of political inclination and apply it to the party preference of Latinos.

Over the years, studies dealing with Latino political behavior have become
disproportionate in comparison to the booming growth of the Hispanic population. Researchers
looking to find the reason behind the political identification of Latinos have been greatly
hindered by their failure to collect sufficient data to match the characteristics of this
heterogeneous group. In many cases the past studies on the partisanship of Latinos have not
been recognized as a national representative and in most situations have often prone to
generalization.
Some studies have only focused on a particular group of Latinos; some went as far as
bulging different country of origins and disregard specific groups of Latinos (Coffin, 2003); some
manage to leave out major groups of Hispanics such Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans
(Bedolla and Alvarez, 2003); and most noticeably, other studies failed to further investigate the
core social factors affecting the partisanship of Hispanics (Clifford, 1993). The latter neglect is
the most imperative of all since social causes have been shown to be potentially helpful in
explaining the socio-economic dynamics behind the political affiliation of Latinos.
Needless to say, the current studies of the Hispanic electorate have become incomplete
with many areas of interest untouched. As a result, it is proposed in this research that data
analysis can be effectively used to predict party identification of Hispanics only if it addresses
the social and economic mobility of Latino voters. In order to clear misconceptions regarding
the party preferences of Hispanics, the present study will conduct a statistical analysis of
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influential socio-economic variables that could have an impending outcome on the party
inclination of Hispanics.
Social Mobility of Hispanics
Essentially, one of the most noticeable social movements faced by minority groups living
in the United States is their transition within the framework of social mobility. Based around
the subsistence of class structure and more importantly social progress, social mobility is often
used to refer to the ability of individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds to move up in the
social ladder (Independent Commission on Social Mobility, 2009). Considering that social
mobility has frequently been applied to class structures, it is entirely promising to contemplate
the body of literature with an analysis as to how the social mobility of Hispanic voters is
attached to their party preference. It is suggested here that the social mobility of Hispanics is
key to understanding their partisan identification and instrumental for investigating their
support for a particular political campaign.
The present examination will be guided by two sets of questions. The first set of
questions deal with the core social characteristics of Hispanics and how their profile can be use
to properly address their party identification. Does country of origin and nationality have a
significant effect on the party affiliation of Hispanics? And last but not least, how does
citizenship status and religion profiling add into their political party preferences?
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The second set of questions touch on the socio-economic factors behind the party
affiliation of Latinos. To be more specific, does income and level of education play a role in the
party identification of Hispanics?
This study will first proceed with a comprehensive description of the Hispanic electorate
to demonstrate how the Hispanic identity is a unique element influencing the political party
preferences of Latinos. After properly introducing the Hispanic demographic, this research will
move on into addressing the social mobility framework as it applies to the socio-economic
influences faced by Hispanic voters. The social mobility section of this study will be heavily use
as a reference guide for finding the adequate socio-economic variables needed to conduct the
necessary cross-sectional analyses.
To form the analyses, this research will use the most recent survey datasets provided by
the Hispanic PEW Research Center in order to demonstrate the strength and validity of socially
driven factors affecting the political partisanship of Hispanics during the 2008 election. Part of
the methodology will include distinct hypothesis aimed at providing a better picture of the
most important social variables behind the party inclination of Hispanics. The end result will
attempt to seek compromise between the present literature and future points of interest
regarding the political behavior of Hispanics.
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Chapter 2: The Profile of the Hispanic Electorate
Hispanics are now the largest minority group in the United States surpassing the
number of African Americans. According to the United States Census Bureau (2010), the
Hispanic population increased by 15.2 million between 2000 and 2010 and accounted for more
than 43 percent of population growth, or four times the nation's 9.7 percent growth rate (U.S.
Census, 2010). It is expected that the growth of Hispanics will bring a change in the
demographic profile of the United States. This change is based on population projections
developed by the PEW Research Center (2008) which speculates that the Latino population will
triple by the year 2050 (Passel and Cohn, 2008). Due to these increasing figures, Hispanics are
becoming more than just a minority group but instead are emerging as a new upcoming
majority.
The voting behavior of Hispanics in the United States mirrors their identity as a diverse
group of people. Among eligible Hispanic voters there are as many conservative, liberals, and
third party political participants as it can be expected of any distinctive population. Political
parties themselves tend to have a hard time addressing Hispanics as a single group due to their
wide variety of ethnic backgrounds and variant identities. Yet, voting analysts continue to seek
for simpler ways of classifying the political views of Hispanics in order to obtain what is now an
influential voting bloc.
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Representation
Of course, as the number of Hispanics goes up so does the number of ethnic labels
assigned to them. The demographic profiling of Hispanics has recently become a taunting task
due to the difficulty of finding out whether or not they are true candidates for pan-ethnic
labels. The federal government commonly categorizes groups of people by race and in some
cases by ethnicity alone. Hispanics are not immune to this rule. In most cases, Hispanics are not
given the proper identifiers. It was not until recently that for the first time the U.S. census
(2000) exclusively provided more distinctive categories for Hispanics to fill in. This recent effort
is shown through the changes made to the latest US census (2010) which expanded the
definition of Hispanic and Latino to also include sub-categorical labels for any person of
“Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture” (U.S.
Census, 2010).
Furthermore, the present ethnic labels have been adjusted in order to accommodate
recent findings showing that Hispanics prefer to identify themselves more in relation to their
country of origin. According to Taylor, Martinez, Lopez, and Velazco, researchers for the PEW
Research Center (2012) “only about one-quarter (24%) of Hispanic adults say they most often
identify themselves by ‘Hispanic’ or ‘Latino” while “the majority of about half (51%) say they
identify themselves most often with their family’s ethnic background such as Mexican, Cuban,
Puerto Rican, Salvadoran or Dominican” (Taylor et al., 2012). Even more surprisingly, first and
second generation Hispanics have also been found to identify themselves primarily by the
country their parents left in order to settle in the United States (PEW Hispanic Center, 2009).
6

Country of Origin and Well-known Patterns of Hispanic Political Affiliation
Hispanics migrate from a diverse number of countries with a distinct number of
governmental and political infrastructures. Most countries in Latin America, for example, tend
to be military oligarchies posing as Democratic Republics while many others are Socialist
Republics (Barrera and Lopez, 2013). Due to this diversity, it is clear that Hispanic voters do not
all vote the same way.
Following the events of the Cuban Revolution, many of the Cubans who were migrating
into the United States were essentially leaving a country which had become politically unstable.
Sudden shifts of governmental rule made the situation even more severe as Cubans went from
living in the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista to the more socialist ruling of Fidel Castro
(Paterson, 1995). Nearly ten years later after Communism had impacted the Cuban
government; more Cubans immigrated to the United States seeking not only refuge but means
of fighting back Communism. As a result, the Republican Party quickly gathered the attention of
Cubans who disagreed with the liberal attitudes of the Democratic Party towards anti-Castro
policies (Paterson, 1995). Many other Cubans were simply looking for a conservative stand
against Communism (Paterson, 1995).
Other major groups of Hispanics such as Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans have
also developed well known loyalties with political parties. From a historical perspective, the
New Deal reforms of 1933 introduced a series of economic programs enacted not only for
financial relief but also as a way of assisting financial and ethnic minorities (Carmines & Stanley,
7

1992). African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans along with many other poor
white Americans benefited the most from these reforms. In exchange, the Democratic Party
saw a huge increase in support from minority groups in disadvantage positions. In addition, the
New Deal also gave birth to a separate set of programs that began to take place in Puerto Rico
from 1935 to 1937. Lead by the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, these social
reforms took on the challenge of land reform while simultaneously improving Puerto Rico’s
agricultural and factory setting (Trias, 1997).
The Issue of Citizenship and Age
In American politics, partisanship has been investigated to a great extent. More
importantly, scholars have research the political behavior and preferences of those who
actually take the time to cast a vote. In many cases, socio-economic reasons prevail as top
contributors affecting voting decisions. Particularly, socio-economic factors tend to be strongly
guided by a particular window of available opportunities. On this particular topic, Robert
Jackson (2003) explains that “the general argument is that citizens at higher levels of
socioeconomic status have the civic skills (including the ability to engage and process political
information), and the time and money that facilitate participation” (Jackson, 2003).
The ability or at least the opportunity to vote has created a point of interest among
researchers. For Hispanics, the most prominent restricting barrier affecting their opportunity to
vote is associated with their citizenship status. Hispanics individuals, especially those of older
age, often lack citizenship and in most cases do not attempt to pursue it at an advance age
8

(Camarillo and Bonilla, 2001). According to a report from the PEW Research Center, Jeffrey
Passel and D’Vera Cohn (2009) estimate that about “three-quarters (76%) of the nation’s
unauthorized immigrant population are Hispanics. The majority of undocumented immigrants
(59%) are from Mexico, numbering 7 million” (Passel and Cohn, 2009).
Even more astonishing than the number of illegal Hispanic immigrants is the number of
many other Hispanics who are just waiting to be part of the Latino voting bloc. Senior
researchers from the PEW Research Center explain that there are “5.4 million adult legal
permanent residents (LPRs) who could not vote because they have not yet become naturalized
U.S. citizens” and “7.1 million are adult unauthorized immigrants and would become eligible to
vote only if Congress were to pass a law creating a pathway to citizenship for them” (PEW
Research Center, 2012).
Adding to the statistical number of illegal Hispanics who continue to have trouble with
their citizenships status is the number of young Hispanic individuals who are yet to become
legible voters. According to the PEW Research Center, Hispanics under the age of 18 compose
the majority of the Latino demographic (PEW Research Center, 2012). To be more precise,
“17.6 million are under the age of 18 and thus too young to vote—for now. The vast majority
(93%) of Latino youths are U.S-born citizens and will automatically become eligible to vote once
they turn 18. Today, some 800,000 Latinos turn 18 each year” (PEW Research Center, 2012).
Thus, for first and second generation Hispanics the problem of citizenship is less of an issue
resulting in a high number of young voters (PEW Research Center, 2008).
9

Moreover, in states like Florida, for example, the “Hispanic eligible voters are younger
than all eligible voters—25% of Hispanic eligible voters are ages 18 to 29 versus 19% of all
eligible vote” (PEW Research Center, 2008). So, by adding the number of unauthorized
immigrants with the legal permanent residents and the number of illegible young Hispanics it
accumulates to about 30.1 million potential Hispanic votes yet to be counted for upcoming
elections.
Religious Affiliation
Finding links between party affiliation and the Hispanic population is no simple task. To
a certain extent, Hispanics like any other particular group of voters are prone to cast their votes
according to their interactions with religious institutions. The most prominent religious
institution amongst Hispanics happens to be the Catholic Church. Estimates of the proportion of
Hispanics who consider themselves as Catholics vary to a high degree, some studies mention
that over half of the Hispanics in their sample consider themselves Catholic while other
researchers conclude that over ninety percent of Hispanics in their studies commonly see
themselves as followers of the Catholic faith (Dolan and Deck, 1997). Despite not having an
accountable figure of Catholic Hispanics, it can be safe to assume that the prominent number of
Roman Catholics found in Central and South America contribute to an abundance number of
Catholic Hispanics living in the United States (Kane and Williams, 2000).
Recent research on the political affiliation of Latino voters show that there is indeed a
connection, although not clear, between party preference and religion. This connection is
10

predominantly troublesome to Democrat party officials who, despite of having strong Hispanic
support, fear that religious Hispanics are more than likely to identify themselves with the
conventional conservative principles of the Republican Party (Espinosa, 2011). This fear of
losing Hispanic voters to the Republican chiefly comes from the unclear support posed by
Protestant Latinos. According to Gaston Espinosa, although many Protestant Hispanics chose to
elect President Clinton in 1996 and then voted again for Al Gore in 2000, they still manage to
switch over to the Republican Party by endorsing the 2004 Bush campaign (Espinosa, 2011).
What is even more alarming to the Democratic party is the fact that “the amount of Latino
Protestants has risen to almost 11 million and they usually have the highest voter turnout in
comparison to Hispanic Catholics” (Espinosa, 2011).
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Chapter 3: The Socio-economic Mobility of Hispanics
In its early theoretical stages, social mobility was structured around class stratification.
In the late 1950’s, social mobility was further expanded to explain the voting behavior of
individuals with different levels of socioeconomic standing. In order to break down the
influences affecting this socioeconomic relationship, political scientists constructed
occupational classification models to pin point the transitions of social mobility among socially
mobile individuals. On this particular association, Gerhard E. Lenski (1966) published data on
the connection between occupation and voting behavior of nine industrialized nations. These
data sets show that in every country, socially mobile individuals (referring to blue collar
workers) had the tendency to vote for a ‘left’ wing party (Lenski. 1966).
On a latter empirical body of research, Lipset and Bendix (1992) further the concept of
social mobility by conducting a cross tabulation of nine industrialized countries to determine
the fluidity or rate of social mobility among the working class (Lipset, and Bendix , 1992). In
their final observation, Lipset and Bendix (1992) concluded that upward social mobility in the
United States is common within the ranks of the elite but not amongst the middle and lower
classes (Lipset, and Bendix , 1992). According to the data recorded from the United States,
people who moved upwards from the blue collar to the middle class turned out to be
more conservative than those belonging to the middle class since their birth (Lipset and
Zetterberg, 1956). In retrospect, social mobility is a very active influence affecting party
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affiliation among American voters and hence becomes an important factor to consider when
studying a particular group of people.
Intragenerational Social Mobility
Similar to any other ethnic group living in the United States, the socioeconomic wellbeing of Hispanics is subject to their economic fluidity, or in other words, becoming upward and
downward mobility are well established possibilities for Hispanics. With this in mind, voting
preferences among Hispanics is, to a substantial extent, dependent on the trajectory of their
social mobility. But in order to measure this trajectory, an intragenerational perspective toward
the social mobility is necessary. Generally speaking, social scientists regard intragenerational,
along with intergenerational, as two of the main forms of social mobility. To be exact,
intragenerational social mobility concerns the ability of a specific individual to move up or down
the ladder within his or her lifetime (OCDE, 2010). Put differently, intragenerational mobility
reflects to the change in socioeconomic status within a single generation.
From a similar perspective, Daniel P. McMurrer, Mark Condon, and Isabel V. Sawhill
(1996) suggest that intragenerational mobility is affected by the total amount of economic
opportunities available to any particular individual (McMurrer, Condon, and Sawhill, 1996).
These authors suggest that intragenerational mobility has an intrinsic effect on peoples’
economic well-being (McMurrer, Condon, and Sawhill, 1996). Indeed, by evaluating race-based
differences in wages and income levels among African American families, Melissa S. Kearney
(2006) found that interactions between race and class continue to play a role in the
13

intragenerational difference in income standing (Kearney, 2006). Now, this research aims in
finding out whether or not Hispanics are also influenced by these socioeconomic factors and
being social mobile can be a major player in determining the political affiliation of Hispanics.
Are Socio-Economic Variables a Good Measurement for Predicting Political Affiliation?
The current American voting literature embodies the use of socio-economic
measurement to predict an individual’s party affiliation. In respect to the socio-economic status
of voters, voting analysts have primarily focused on explaining how an individual’s level of
education, profession, and overall level of income affect their political inclination. For the most
part, casting a ballot for a political candidate is directly related to an individual’s economic wellbeing. Thus overtime, social-economic measurements have become sound and reliable
predictors of political partisanship. For one, socio-economic variables are not constant and in
most cases create a chain of economic resources that ultimately guide a voter’s party affiliation.
The opportunity to attend college or at least some sort of preparatory/technical schooling, for
example, allows for an individual to have not only a broader number of job opportunities but
also the likelihood of attaining a higher paying job. In return, those individuals who are better
off economically are more at stake and in most cases make them more aware of the surfacing
political and economic issues brought up by political parties (Zaller, 1990). Regrettably for
Hispanics, this chain of socio-economic opportunities is limited and sometimes nonexistent due
to their setbacks on their trajectory to becoming economically mobile.

14

Barriers to Social Mobility
Becoming upwardly mobile, in terms of having a prosperous economic future, is in itself
a hardship endured by almost every ethnic group. To a large extent, the country in which one
resides is a good indicator of how far an individual can grow socially and economically. On the
world stage, socialism and capitalism reign over a country’s labor workforce, education
prospects, living standards and essentially their limits to social mobility. Unfortunately for
Hispanics, capitalism as seen in the United States is rare in Latin America thus becoming
intuitive to note that Hispanic immigrants have little to no experience with capitalism. To no
surprise, many Hispanics immigrating from Central and South America face not only a cultural
shock but also a social readjustment. Although many Hispanics succeed in progressing through
this economic readjustment many others do not.
Disadvantage in the Educational System and its effect on Job Opportunities
For Hispanics living in the United States, the American educational system is one of
disproportionate disadvantage. Hispanics attending K-12 educational system are less likely to
have the necessary resources that many other students receive. Unfortunately for Hispanics,
private schooling is often out of the question leaving Hispanics students with no choice but to
attend public schools. In most cases, Hispanic students are matriculated in large public schools
that assist a high number of minority students. Although many of these public schools offer
access to special aide programs, as it is often the case, the clustering of minority students
creates a number of problematic learning environments for Hispanics (Valdés, 2001).
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Furthermore, usually problems arise from the failure to hire properly trained educators
with enough cultural diversity to teach multinational groups of minorities (Valdés, 2001). As a
direct consequence, learning programs such as ESL which is designed to improve the English for
Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) become ill equipped in proving the right kind of learning
environment for Hispanics children. Researching the disparities in the teaching of Hispanics
students, Claudia Galindo and Sean F. Reardon (2006) found:
“Overall, only a small percentage of Hispanic students have teachers with five or
more years experience teaching in bilingual or ESL classes. Even among the
contextually/linguistically disadvantaged subgroups of Hispanics, fewer than 25%
of students have teachers with five or more years of bilingual education
experience, and fewer than one-eighth of students have teachers with five or
more years of ESL teaching experience.“ (Galindo and Reardon, 2006)
But not all the educational disadvantages faced by Hispanics stem from inefficient public
teaching. In addition, the home environment of Hispanic students has been shown to promote
little to no aide towards education. Claudia Galindo and Sean F. Reardon (2006) describe this
inefficient home environment surrounding Hispanics as:
“Students who are contextually/linguistically and/or socioeconomically
disadvantaged have, on average fewer educational resources (books, computers)
in their homes, are less likely to have attended center-based child care, and are
read to less often by their parents than are more advantaged Hispanic subgroups
16

(South American- and Cuban-origin students, third-generation Mexican students,
students from homes where English is the predominant language used)” (Quote
from pg, 3)
Parallel to the experiences of Hispanic students in the K-12 system, older Hispanics
looking to enroll in postsecondary institution regularly find themselves short on economic
resources. Lack of state funding of public universities and technical institutions has increased
the amount of financial burden taken on by Hispanic students. As a direct result, one study
finds that Hispanics often choose to obtaining a short technical or vocational degree rather
than attending 4-year Universities (Campbell, 1986). In the short run, a technical degree has
proved to have improved the lives of Hispanic minority workers by providing them with the
necessary working experience needed to obtain a salary that pays above minimum wage.
It is proposed here that in order for us to get a complete picture of the Hispanic
voting preference we must analyze the Hispanic economics from a collective approach. This
collective approach leads us to inquire about the overall economic burden meet head-on by
many Hispanic voters. To do such task, this research utilizes survey data in order to address
total household income earned by eligible Hispanic voters.
In retrospect, although the social mobility of Hispanics cannot be directly represented
with a single economic measure or with a less complex measure such as language fluency it is,
nevertheless, an ongoing framework barrier affecting the party preference of Hispanics. This
paper analyzes the effect of social mobility on the party identification of Hispanics by making
17

connections between two most influential socio-economic variables: income and education
attainment. The application of income, for example, gives us a better idea of the discrepancies
existing within the party identification of those Hispanics who happen to be less fortunate and
those Hispanics who are better off economically. Similarly, testing for education attainment
gives us a solid foundation for addressing the lack of resources available to Hispanic voters.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
To adequately address the Hispanics electorate, it is necessary to combine social and
economic factors that shape their social mobility in America. The use of social mobility to deal
with the demographic portfolio of Hispanics gives this research the variables needed to
understand the political preferences of Hispanics. To recap, the Hispanics are subject to a
number of social factors that ultimately affect their affiliation. Social standings such as
citizenship, for instance, have become major obstacles in the political participation and
affiliation of Hispanics.
The lack of citizenship restrains a large portion of Hispanics from voting and as a result
we are seeing a strong number of young Hispanic voters. With this trend in mind, this paper
aims to put focus on the party affiliation of young Hispanic voters while simultaneously
acknowledging other traditional social factors that affect political preference. In other words,
the present study also takes into consideration the importance of religion on the partisanship
of Hispanics. Moreover, this paper suggests that we must address the party preference of
Hispanics according to their perspective country of origin. To do such task, we must break down
party affiliation by nationality.
In part, Hispanics also pertain to the challenge of facing a various numbers of economic
setbacks. A disadvantage position on educational system, for example, has been well
documented to be a result of disadvantages in the workforce. Such factors ultimately take a toll
on the economic well-being of Latinos. Many of these factors can be mentally pictured as a
19

chain of reactions that starts with the lack of educational attainment and shrinks down even
more narrowly as the number of available economic opportunities are reduced to a minimum.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that almost all economic driven factors mentioned
in this paper have a direct link to the political affiliation of Hispanics. Preceding research on the
political affiliation of Hispanic has slightly touched on this relation. For example, Malcolm Coffin
(2003) previously demonstrated that the longer Latinos lived in the United States the more
likely was the chance that they will become Democrats. In the same report, Coffin (2003)
conducted a correlation in which he found that high earning Hispanics preferred and relate
more with the Republican Party while lower earning Hispanics had tendencies to support the
Democratic Party.
Another social pattern was linked to the party affiliation of Hispanics when Keysar and
Kosmin (1995) concluded that there was a constructive relation between Democratic
partisanship and the income, age and religion of Hispanics. Specifically, Keysar and Kosmin
(1995) discovered that “Protestantism and higher income favour the Republicans and
femaleness [referring to feminism] and older age Hispanics assist the Democrats” (Keysar &
Kosmin, 1995). Withstanding, many other researchers have also shown that income is in fact
halfheartedly connected with the Democratic Party preference.
With equal power, education has been shown to be an important factor affecting the
political preference of Hispanics. On this particular topic, Lisa Bedolla and Michael Alvarez
(2003) found that highly educated Hispanics were more likely to associate with the Republican
20

Party (Bedolla and Alvarez, 2003). On the other hand, these results clearly conflict with Coffin’s
(2003) conclusion which states the opposite. Coffin (2003) concluded that a higher education
level amongst Hispanics resulted in their increase support for the Democratic Party.
It is suggested that social mobility connects this research to the independent socioeconomic backgrounds affecting the party preferences of Hispanics. The goal of this research is
to examine the party preferences of Hispanics while still keeping in mind their identity and
nationality differences. The second purpose of this paper is to attempt to link the social reasons
behind the Hispanic support for the Democratic and Republican institutions. In addition, the
research question of whether or not social mobility has an impact on the party affiliation of
Hispanics will be dependent upon the analysis of economic and social causes.
While not many scholars have connected the literature on social mobility to our
understanding of the Hispanic electorate, it is nevertheless an increasingly relevant and
important connection to make. To test this connection this paper aims to examine the
following hypotheses about the party identification of Hispanics:
•

Income: Those Hispanics who report to have low household income are more likely to
support the Democratic Party; those who are better off financially are more likely to
support the Republican Party.

•

Education: Hispanics with low educational attainment will identify themselves as
Democrats. It is expected that as Hispanics obtain more education they will more likely
support the Republican Party.
21

•

Age: A majority of Hispanic voters are more likely to be young individuals. Young
Hispanics are more likely to vote for Democrats.

•

Religion: Catholic Hispanics are more likely to be Democrats.

•

Country of Origin: Cuban Americans are less likely to be Democrats. On the other hand,
Puerto Ricans and Mexican American are more likely to support the Democratic Party.
Data Collection
For research purposes, this study will rely on aggregated survey data provided by the

PEW Research Center. The national surveys will be used to create a multivariate, binary logistic
model between the socio-economic variables of Hispanic voters and their party preferences. In
order to address this link, the present research will use the Hispanics’ 2008 Post-Election
National Survey of Latinos.
The 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latinos contains a series of survey questions
representing post electoral opinions of 1,540 Latino respondents. The survey covers political
questions as well as corresponding demographics of Hispanic respondents. The entire sample is
compose of responses from Hispanics ages 18 and older.
Coding
The dependent variable consisted of the number of responses given by Hispanics
regarding their partisanship: “Democrat”, “Republican”, and “Independent.” This study omitted
those who selected “Refused” as a response to their partisanship simply because it provided
little insight into the investigation. Due to this omission, there is a few number of missing cases
22

which come from those who refused to specify a party identification. In addition several
changes were made to the 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latino for the purpose of
either simplifying or merging common responses from respondents. For example, this study recategorizes many of the categories under “Highest Degree of Education.” The attainment of
education was re-coded and grouped by the highest level of education achieved. Those
Hispanics who completed “none or grades 1-8” and “Grades 9-11” were labeled as falling
under the “Less than High School” category. Moreover, those who originally reported being a
“GED” or “high school graduate” were merged together and labeled as “High School Graduate.”
In the case of those who acquired higher education, the label “Some College” was created in
order to include those who originally reported having “vocational training” or “some college.”
Finally, “College Graduate” and “Post Graduate” were left as originally coded by the PEW
Research Center.
Total Household income and Age was left alone according to the original interval coding
provided by the PEW Research Center. The interval coding for age was also left on its original
continuous state as it proves to be the most efficient way to test the relationship between age
and party affiliation.
In addition, the coding for “Country of Origin” was slightly redesigned to exclude those
who “Refused”, “Don’t Know”, and most importantly those Hispanics who selected “Other
European.” Once again, these exclusions are made because they do not affect the overall focus
of the study and are not within the scope of this research. Lastly, the “Religion” variable was
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left in its original state but slightly changed to exclude those who selected “Refused” for their
religious affiliation. In retrospect, all of these changes were made to accommodate for simpler
evaluation of the independent predictors.
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Chapter 5: Results
After re-coding the desired variables, this research moved on into analyzing the effect of
Hispanic’s income, age, religious affiliation, country of origin, and educational achievement on
the political affiliation of Latinos. Once again, the results were gathered from the 2008 postelection national survey of Latinos which contains a series of survey questions measured in
relation to the political preferences of 1,540 Latino respondents. In order to better understand
the basic relationship between political affiliation and the predictor variables, an analysis with a
series of cross tabulations is necessary because it allows us to explore the available data sets
before trying to model things in a statistical way.
Table 1: Spearman Correlation between Total Household Income and Political Party Affiliation for the
2008 Election.
Affiliation

Correlation Coefficient
Affiliation

1.000

-.088**

.

.002

1213

1213

**

1.000

.002

.

1213

1540

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient

-.088

Total Household Income Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Total
Household
Income

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Pew Research Center, 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latinos.

Table 1 show that there is indeed a relationship between the total household income
and party affiliation. As shown above, there is a negative relationship between this two
variables and it is a statistically significant with a P-value of 0.002.
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Table 2: Cross Tabulation of Highest Degree of Education and Political Party Affiliation for the
2008 Election.
Highest Degree of Education

Count
% within
Republican Affiliation
% within
Education
Count
% within
Democrat

Affiliation
% within
Education
Count
% within

Independent Affiliation
% within
Education
Count
% within
Total

Affiliation
% within
Education

Total

Less than

High School

Some

College

Post-

High school

Graduate

College

Graduate

Graduate

55

35

44

32

31.4%

20.0%

25.1%

18.3%

11.8%

11.7%

18.9%

21.9%

15.3%

14.6%

246

175

128

81

34

664

37.0%

26.4%

19.3%

12.2%

52.9%

58.7%

54.9%

55.5%

57.6%

55.3%

164

88

61

33

16

362

45.3%

24.3%

16.9%

9.1%

35.3%

29.5%

26.2%

22.6%

27.1%

30.1%

465

298

233

146

59

1201

38.7%

24.8%

19.4%

12.2%

4.9% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

Source: Pew Research Center, 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latinos.
Chi-square value is 21.853 and is statistically significant.
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9

175

5.1% 100.0%

5.1% 100.0%

4.4% 100.0%

For the highest level of education, there are a large number of respondents who
reported having both “Less than High School Education” and Democrat affiliation. In addition,
there is a significant number of Hispanics who affiliated themselves as Democrats while
obtaining some post-secondary education or obtained a college degree and beyond. As shown
above, the Chi-square value is 21.853 and is statistically significant with a P-value of 0.005.
Table 3: Spearman Correlation between Age and Political Affiliation.
Affiliation
1.000

-.172**

.

.000

1213

1213

-.172**

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

N

1213

1540

Correlation Coefficient
Affiliation

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient

Age

Age

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: Pew Research Center, 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latinos.

Table 3 shows that there is indeed a relationship between Hispanic’s age and their party
affiliation. As shown above, there is a negative relationship between this two variables and it is
statistically significant.
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Table 4: Cross Tabulation of Country of Origin and Political Party Affiliation for the 2008 Election
Country of Origin
Affiliation

Count
% within
Republican

Affiliation

Total

Mexican

Puerto

Cuban

Dominican

Other

Other

(Mexico)

Rican

(Cuba)

(the

Central

South

(Puerto

Dominican

American

American

Rico)

Republic)

(Central

(South

America)

America)

99

14

22

3

6

8

152

65.1%

9.2%

14.5%

2.0%

3.9%

5.3%

100.0%

14.3%

12.0%

39.3%

4.7%

8.1%

9.1%

13.9%

376

87

14

52

38

46

613

61.3%

14.2%

2.3%

8.5%

6.2%

7.5%

100.0%

54.2%

74.4%

25.0%

81.2%

51.4%

52.3%

56.1%

219

16

20

9

30

34

328

66.8%

4.9%

6.1%

2.7%

9.1%

10.4%

100.0%

31.6%

13.7%

35.7%

14.1%

40.5%

38.6%

30.0%

694

117

56

64

74

88

1093

63.5%

10.7%

5.1%

5.9%

6.8%

8.1%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% within
Country
of Origin
Count
% within

Democrat

Affiliation
% within
Country
of Origin
Count
% within

Independent Affiliation
% within
Country
of Origin
Count
Total

% within
Affiliation
% within
Country

Source: Pew Research Center, 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latinos.
Chi-square value is 80.204 and is statistically significant.
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Table 4 shows that when party affiliation was broken down according to the country of
origin of Hispanics there were sharp contrasts and results. There were a large number of
Hispanics respondents who were both of Mexican descent and affiliated themselves with the
Democratic Party. Surprisingly, there was not a sharp difference in the amount of Cubans who
reported being Republican and those who support Democrats. The cross-tab for country of
origin indicates a relative split in Cuban and party id. As shown in Table 4, the Chi-square value
is 80.204 and is statistical significant with a P-value of 0.001.

Table 5: Cross Tabulation of Religion and Political Party Affiliation for the 2008 Election.
Religion
Affiliation
Count
Republican

Democrat

Independent

Total

Catholic Evangelical
Christian

Total

Protestant

Something else

95

49

6

% within Affiliation

56.5%

29.2%

3.6%

% within Religion

12.2%

26.2%

18.2%

16.8%

15.2%

450

87

19

57

613

% within Affiliation

73.4%

14.2%

3.1%

% within Religion

57.8%

46.5%

57.6%

53.3%

55.4%

234

51

8

32

325

% within Affiliation

72.0%

15.7%

2.5%

% within Religion

30.0%

27.3%

24.2%

29.9%

29.4%

779

187

33

107

1106

70.4%

16.9%

3.0%

9.7% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

Count

Count

Count
% within Affiliation
% within Religion

Source: Pew Research Center, 2008 Post-Election National Survey of Latinos.
Chi-square value is 24.179 and is statistically significant.
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18

168

10.7% 100.0%

9.3% 100.0%

9.8% 100.0%

As show in table 5, there was a sharp difference in the number of Hispanic respondents
who reported being both Democrats and Catholics. Yet, Hispanic Protestants or Evangelical
Christians did not show such contrast in numbers. The Chi-square value for this relationship is
24.179 and is statistical significant with a P-value of 0.001.
Social and economic variables such as religion, income, age, education, and country of
origin all have different effect on the political affiliation of Hispanics. One major precaution to
acknowledge is the fact that there were a number of missing cases pertaining to excluded
responses. Nevertheless, this research still found a number of significant relationships. There
was a large number of Hispanics who reported being Catholics and Democrats. Similarly, there
were also a number of Hispanics, which according to cross-tabulations, chose to affiliate with
the Republican Party. In addition, Cuban Americans along with Puerto Ricans turned out to be
predominately Democrats. Still, Mexican descendants demonstrated to be sharp supporters of
the Democratic Party. Finally, Hispanics with low educational attainment were found to be
predominately Democrats.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Similar to the previous extensive literature dealing with party affiliation, this study
analyzed the effect of social and economic factors on the political affiliation of Hispanics. This
study utilized the most recent dataset provided by the PEW Research Center in order to
evaluate the latest political inclination favored by Hispanic voters. As mentioned in the first
couple of chapters, Hispanics like any other ethnic group are confronted with socio-economic
influences such as education and income which intensify the complexity of their political
participation. Moreover, this researched primarily goal was to explain the traditional socioeconomic variables of Hispanics and their party affiliation. With this in mind, this research
presents the idea that we must carefully evaluate not one but several defining factors affecting
the political affiliation of Hispanic voters.
This research concludes that the previous research done on American party affiliation
can be successfully applied to Hispanics. Moreover, the present study connects the social
mobility literature to a few of the most important factors affecting the party preference of
Hispanics. Religion was an influential factor that led us to see that Hispanic respondent
reported being both Catholics and Democrats. On the other hand, there was also a large
number of Hispanics who were reported being Protestant and supporters of the Republican
Party.
In the end, the Hispanic electorate is quickly expanding and growing in number by the
day. As a result, future political analysts looking to understand the party affiliation of Hispanics
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should not hesitate to go beyond socio-economic variables. When it comes to party alliance,
there are a number of important issues that voters tend to heavily consider when choosing
their party partisanship. Many of these imperative issues are controversial in nature. To
Hispanics, immigration is one of those controversial topics that, in general, are given the
highest priority.
Any political party looking to obtain the Latino voting bloc must fully stand behind the
issue of immigration in order to appeal to Hispanics. Nevertheless, immigration policies are
normally not so straightforward. In other words, targeting immigration involves tapping into
other areas of public policy that this research did not cover. Particularly, immigration laws tend
to cover a large number of other distinct issues such as entrance to the United States, working
permits, welfare, governmental assistance and across-the-board immigration control in which
not all Hispanics agreed on. Noting that not all Hispanics agree on the immigration subject,
party officials needs to at least attempt to address the issue by confronting the debate head on.
In retrospect, future researchers attempting to profile the Hispanic electorate should
have an understanding of their demographic and communal stand on politics. Without a doubt,
the political and social experiences of Hispanics act as the very core foundation for their
tendencies to support political parties. More importantly, Hispanics have developed a strong
sense of identity and along with it an immense amount of groundwork towards a solid form of
representation in the American political system. In the end, future researchers might want to
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consider not only the demographics of Hispanic voters but also their attitudes toward political
institutions.
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